### INTERNATIONAL GAS CONFERENCE - DG GROUP -

Russia

### COMPETITVE MULTI-SITE SOURCING

### OF NATURAL GAS FROM AN INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE

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### **OVERVIEW**

- INEOS
- STATE OF PLAY BELGIAN GAS MARKET
- TENDERING APPROACH
- RfQ FUNDAMENTALS
- LEARNINGS
- RESULTS
- CONCLUSION



# INEOS

- 2008 Sales approx €29bn
- 14,000 employees\*
- 62 manufacturing sites worldwide\*
- 32 million tonnes of chemicals capacity
- 20 million tonnes of refinery products (400,000 bbls/day)
- 3<sup>rd</sup> largest chemical company globally
- Headquarter: UK
  - \* excl. joint ventures



# **INEOS PRESENCE IN BELGIUM**





#### **STATE OF PLAY – BELGIAN MARKET**

- STILL DOMINANCE OF THE TYPICAL CONTINENTAL MARKET
  - OIL INDEXED PRICE FORMULA: GAS-TO-OIL PRICE DRIVER
- END CONSUMERS CAN NOT BENEFIT FROM THE STRATEGIC LOCATION OF THE BELGIAN MARKET AS THE EUROPEAN JUNCTION:
  - SHOULD WORK IN THEORY : INTERCONNECTION WITH GAS-TO-GAS UK MARKET, LNG TERMINAL, ZEEBRUGGE HUB, ZEEPIPE TO NORTH, ACCESS TO LOW CAL, CONNECTIONS TO EAST (UPSTREAM – Russian gas),...
  - IN PRACTICE : ALL KIND OF LIMITATIONS (Physically & Commercially)
- INCREASING NUMBER OF SHIPPERS/SUPPLIERS
  - DG (ENI), ESSENT (RWE), GdF-SUEZ, WINGAS, ...




#### **STATE OF PLAY – BELGIAN GRID ISSUES / HURDLES**

- GRID OPERATOR = FLUXYS
- REGULATED ACTIVITY
- TRANSPORT MODEL/ ENTRY EXIT
  - HIGHLY COMPLEX SYSTEM: CHP TWO SHIPPERS
  - HOURLY BALANCING OBLIGATIONS
  - UNFAVORABLE RULES FOR NEW ENTRANTS
  - HIGH PENALTIES IN CASE EXCEEDENCE OF
    - CAPACITY
    - FLEXIBILITY
- LOW CALORIFIC ISOLATED GAS MARKET




#### **INEOS GAS NEEDS IN BELGIUM**




**Source : Fluxys** 





#### **MULTI SITE PROCUREMENT APPROACH**





## **RfQ FUNDAMENTALS**

- VOLUME: 3TWh / YEAR
- DURATION: 1 / 2 YEARS / LONGER
- PRICE STRUCTURE:
  - FIXED
  - OIL INDEXED
  - HUB PRICE SPOT
  - PROPOSAL OF SUPPLIER
- VOLUME COMMITMENTS (TOP TOT)
- TRANSPORT
- NOMINATIONS
- SITE SPECIFICS
  - 2 COGENERATION SITES WITH BALANCING/ALLOCATION PROTOCOL
  - LOW / HIGH CALL



# **LEARNINGS (1)**

- ENTRY / EXIT TRANSPORT MODEL
  - COMPLEX SYSTEM
    eg. COGENERATION 2 SHIPPERS
  - GENERAL : UNFAVOURABLE FOR NEW ENTRANTS
  - STRINGENT BALACING OBLIGATIONS
  - CAPACITY RESERVATION
    - UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES ; BLOCK COMPETITION
  - UNLIMITED PENALTIES IN CASE OF EXCEEDENCE OF
    - CAPACITY LIMITS
    - FLEXIBILITY LIMITS
- HUB ACCESS
  - DIFFICULT TO ACCESS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL GAS CONSUMER



## **LEARNINGS (2)**

- TYPICAL CONTINENTAL MARKET
  - GAS-TO-OIL PRICE STRUCTURE
- LIMITED NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS TO LARGE SCALE CONSUMERS
- DOMINANT POSITION
- LARGE DIFFERENCES IN:
  - VOLUME COMMITMENTS (TIME FRAME VOLUME WINDOW)
- AMPLE COMPETITION IN LOW CAL MARKET



# LEARNINGS (3) (MULTI-SITE)

- LINE-UP OF CONTRACTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL SITES
- LONG LEAD TIME (eg. INTERNAL DECISION PROCESS) START TIMELY
- TECHNICAL & COMMERCIAL RESOURCES
- LINE-UP OF INTERNAL DECISION PROCESSES
  -> FINAL AWARD IN 15 MIN.SLOT
- INTERNAL ALLOCATION MODEL
- EXPLORED TO EXTEND BELGIUM PROC.MODEL TO PAN EUROPEAN SCALE
  - NO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
  - EXTRA EFFORTS



### RESULTS

- STRONG MARKET APETITE FOR MULTI SITE SUPPLY IN BELGIUM
- HOWEVER NO INTEREST IN PAN EUROPEAN SUPPLY
- MAXIMIZED SYNERGIES ON BELGIAN PLATFORM (4 SITES/4 BUSINESS)
- FLEXIBILITY ADVANTAGE
  - VOLUME
  - BALANCING
- VOLUME COMMITMENTS STILL ON THE HIGH SIDE
- FIRST SIGNS OF NEW MARKET MECHANISM GAS-TO-GAS NEXT TO OIL-TO-GAS
- CONTRACTS MANAGEMENT
  - MORE COMPLEX
  - NEEDS COORDINATION



### CONCLUSION

- FIRST SIGNS OF MARKET FUNCTIONING
  - INCREASING NUMBER OF SHIPPERS SHOW INTEREST
  - > ADVANTAGE OF SCALE CAPACITY & FLEXIBILITY
  - MARKET MECHANISMS WIDEN GAS-TO-GAS NEXT TO GAS-TO-OIL <u>BUT</u> STILL A LONG WAY TO GO:
    - > COMPLEX GRID RULES
    - LOW CAL ISLAND
    - HIGH VOLUME COMMITMENTS
    - > CAPPED ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES
- COMPLETE DESINTEREST OF SUPPLIERS TO SUPPLY ON A PAN EUROPEAN BASIS
  - > NO EUROPEAN MARKET
  - MS HURDLES

#### WHY?